

CHAPTER 8

An Overview of Enduring Rivalries and Enduring Rivalries Research

Studying enduring rivalries narrows our focus from over one thousand rivalries of all varieties to only a small fraction of them, and an even smaller fraction of possible dyadic combinations. Nevertheless, much of the history of international war and peace over the past two centuries revolves around these pairs of states. In this chapter, we present our list of enduring rivalries and discuss some of their characteristics, extending some of the data description first presented in chapter 3. The last part of the chapter is dedicated to reviewing previous research on enduring rivalries and related subjects, with an eye to identifying any consensus in this limited body of research and assessing how that empirical evidence comports with the expectations of the punctuated equilibrium model.

General Characteristics of Enduring Rivalries

Table 8.1 presents our list of 63 enduring rivalries over the 1816–1992 period, along with the beginning and ending dates, the duration, and the number of militarized disputes for each rivalry. Among the 63 rivalries, 37 cannot be said to have ended definitely by 1992, the last date for data on militarized disputes; we refer to these as censored cases.¹ Although there is a 6-dispute minimum in order to qualify as an enduring rivalry, the mean rivalry experiences considerably more militarized disputes. Among the full set of cases, the average is 14.98 disputes, with 11.92 disputes among the noncensored cases (the total for the whole population will underestimate the true average, as some ongoing rivalries are likely to experience one or more disputes before they end). Most

¹Technically there is some possibility that our early rivalries could be left-censored as well; that is, some rivalries may have actually begun before 1816, the starting date of our study. Yet an analysis of the enduring rivalry list and the earliest starting dates reveals that this is not a possibility, given our coding rules for the interconnection of disputes in the same rivalry. It is conceivable, and we have no way to verify this, that some cases identified as proto-rivalries in the early nineteenth century would qualify as enduring rivalries if it were possible to extend the time frame before 1816.

enduring rivalries also dramatically exceed the 20-year time minimum with the mean enduring rivalry lasting 37.89 years if one includes all the cases and 38.61 years if one focuses solely on those rivalries that have clearly ended.

There does not appear to be a strong secular trend toward longer rivalries over the time period, although this is difficult to ascertain given the large number of ongoing rivalries. Somewhat surprising, few enduring rivalries span large tracts of both centuries. Only three rivalries last more than eighty years. These are the dyadic rivalries among Russia/USSR, China, and Japan respectively, competitions largely over territorial expansion and hegemony in Asia. The Russia–China rivalry has its origins in the 1860s² and cannot be judged to have ended by 1992. This is astounding given that both countries have undergone tremendous economic changes and several dramatic regime changes (both to Communist regimes in the twentieth century). The same might be said for Japan, whose internal and foreign policy changes have been at least as dramatic. Especially notable is that these three states, at various times over the long periods in their rivalries, have been allies with one another. This illustrates that rivalries may persist even when temporary war or other alignments occur.

In contrast to the continuous rivalries between Russia, China, and Japan, there are several cases of what we have called interrupted rivalries, rivalries that abate for a period of time, only to be renewed again. The Greece–Turkey (then the Ottoman Empire) rivalry has its origins in the middle of the nineteenth century, but its militarized component ends with its last dispute in 1925. Historical animosities blossom again in 1958 and continue today, despite their common NATO membership, illustrating once again that a common external enemy will not necessarily drive allies closer together on other issues of contention. Chile and Argentina also have an interrupted rivalry, with one enduring rivalry occurring before World War I and another commencing after World War II. There are also several instances of interrupted rivalries among the major powers, including between the United Kingdom and Russia and between France and Germany respectively.

There may be a secular trend toward more intense rivalries after World War II. Whether this is a function of Cold War rivalries fought over more contentious issues or some other characteristics of the rivalry or the rivals is not clear. It may be that modern states are capable of more frequent interactions with their friends and enemies alike and that the projection of military force is also easier, thereby generating more frequent militarized interactions. Three rivalries appear especially intense, each producing more than one dispute per year on average. The United States–USSR superpower rivalry was the most intense with 1.33 disputes per year. Not far behind are Syria–Israel (1.18 disputes per year) and United States–China (1.05 disputes per year).

²The rivalry may have actually begun a century or two before this, but our study does not begin until 1816 and the rivalry does not become consistently militarized until the 1860s.

TABLE 8.1: Enduring rivalries, 1816–1992

Rivalry	Life	Disputes	Duration
USA–Cuba	1959–1990	15	31
USA–Mexico	1836–1893	17	57
USA–Ecuador	1952–1981	8	28
USA–Peru	1955–1992	6	37
USA–UK	1837–1861	8	24
USA–Spain	1850–1875	10	25
USA–USSR	1946–1986	53	40
USA–China	1949–1972	24	23
USA–N. Korea	1950–1985	18	35
Honduras–Nicaragua	1907–1929	6	22
Ecuador–Peru	1891–1955	21	64
Brazil–UK	1838–1863	6	24
Chile–Argentina	1873–1909	10	36
Chile–Argentina	1952–1984	17	32
UK–Germany	1887–1921	7	34
UK–Russia	1876–1923	17	47
UK–USSR	1939–1985	18	46
UK–Turkey	1895–1934	10	39
UK–Iraq	1958–1992	10	34
Belgium–Germany	1914–1940	8	26
France–Germany	1911–1945	9	34
France–Germany	1830–1887	12	57
France–Turkey	1897–1938	11	41
France–China	1870–1900	6	30
Spain–Morocco	1957–1980	8	23
Germany–Italy	1914–1945	7	31
Italy–Yugoslavia	1923–1956	8	33
Italy–Ethiopia	1923–1943	6	20
Italy–Turkey	1880–1924	14	44
Yugoslavia–Bulgaria	1913–1952	8	39
Greece–Bulgaria	1914–1952	9	38
Greece–Turkey	1958–1989	14	30
Greece–Turkey	1866–1925	17	59
Cyprus–Turkey	1965–1988	7	24
USSR–Norway	1956–1987	9	32
USSR–Iran	1908–1987	18	80
Russia–Turkey	1876–1921	12	45
USSR–China	1862–1986	50	124
USSR–Japan	1895–1984	43	90

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TABLE 8.1—*continued*

Congo Brazzaville–Zaire	1963–1987	7	23
Uganda–Kenya	1965–1989	6	24
Somalia–Ethiopia	1960–1985	16	25
Ethiopia–Sudan	1967–1988	8	21
Morocco–Algeria	1962–1984	6	22
Iran–Iraq	1953–1992	20	40
Iraq–Israel	1967–1991	6	24
Iraq–Kuwait	1961–1992	9	31
Egypt–Israel	1948–1989	36	41
Syria–Jordan	1949–1991	9	41
Syria–Israel	1948–1986	45	38
Jordan–Israel	1948–1973	13	25
Israel–Saudi Arabia	1957–1981	6	24
Saudi Arabia–N. Yemen	1962–1984	6	21
Afghanistan–Pakistan	1949–1989	11	40
China–S. Korea	1950–1987	9	37
China–Japan	1873–1958	34	85
China–India	1950–1987	22	37
N. Korea–S. Korea	1949–1992	20	43
S. Korea–Japan	1953–1982	15	29
India–Pakistan	1947–1991	40	44
Thailand–Cambodia	1953–1987	14	34
Thailand–Laos	1960–1988	13	27
Thailand–N. Vietnam	1961–1989	6	28

Rivalry in the Middle East is typically characterized as the Arab-Israeli rivalry, but this simple characterization badly misstates conflict relationships in that region. First, it ignores the five other rivalries among the largely Arab states themselves. Second, it implies that Israel's rivalries with its neighbors are largely uniform. In fact, they are quite different. Not all of Israel's disputes involve the same set of rivals (Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia). The Israeli rivalries with Syria and Egypt are far more intense than other Arab-Israeli rivalries. Furthermore, Jordan effectively opts out of the Arab alliance with Israel following the 1973 war and that particular rivalry ends. We note in passing here that it will be interesting to assess in our chapter 12 analyses how these Middle East rivalries, and others, are linked to one another.

Our enduring rivalry list results from the theoretical and operational criteria discussed in chapter 3. With a concrete set of rivalries in hand, we revisit a couple of contested issues in the conceptualization of enduring rivalry, namely power asymmetry and the notion of principal rivalries. We think both these concerns flow from a common inference that *enduring* rivalry means *severe* rivalry.

We have ourselves contributed to this notion by showing that a large percentage of wars and disputes occur within enduring rivalries. Although this is an empirical fact, our conceptualization in no way implies this. As the adjective *enduring* indicates, our list of enduring rivalries are those militarized competitions that have lasted a long time. It is absolutely crucial to separate “how long” from “how severe” a rivalry is.

Thompson’s (1995) idea of principal rivalries taps, we believe, the severity dimension of (enduring) rivalries. To the extent that it does, we see no conceptual conflict, and we agree that some enduring rivalries are more important to a given state than others and are likely to be more severe. If we examine our list of enduring rivalries, we can see that major powers often have multiple enduring rivalries. Without a doubt, some mean more to the major power than others: the United States–Peru rivalry is not equivalent to the United States–USSR. Within the punctuated equilibrium framework, we see that rivalries can lock into low as well as high-level, long-term conflicts. A major part of a theory of enduring rivalries is explaining *why* some enduring rivalries are more severe than others. To answer this question, one needs *variation* in enduring rivalry severity.

A second issue raised by Vasquez (1993), initially noted in chapters 2 and 3, concerns power asymmetry and enduring rivalry. On the (realist) face of it, long-term power conflict between asymmetric dyads appears implausible. The simple, and simplistic, response would be that our list contains a fair number of such asymmetric dyads. In coarse power terms, there are 19 major-minor enduring rivalries.³ One can push that further, since among the minor-minor dyads some notable power asymmetries exist, such as between Israel–Jordan or Spain–Morocco.

Two considerations come to mind when examining the asymmetric enduring rivalries on our list. One is that low-level conflicts often drag on. Recall that many militarized disputes do not always constitute major diplomatic incidents. If one thinks of enduring rivalries only as the most severe conflicts, then we miss a real possibility: long-term, low-level conflicts. A second fact leaps out from the list: many major-minor rivalries are linked to major-major ones. A tendency when thinking about rivalries is to ignore the linkages between them; for example, the Germany–Belgium rivalry does not develop without the Germany–United Kingdom or Germany–France rivalries. One of Vasquez’s two paths to war is through conflict diffusion—our linkage concept. It appears that this is a possible path to enduring rivalry as well.

As we move to our analysis of enduring rivalries, it is important to keep in mind that when we use the term *enduring rivalry* we refer to a particular conceptualization. In particular, one should not confound the duration and severity dimensions of rivalries. We feel that a good concept and accompanying data

³We count only those that remained major-minor rivalries throughout their whole existence, as the number of major powers fluctuates over time.

set should not make controversial theoretical issues part of data collection. By remaining noncommittal, our list of enduring rivalries then permits tests of theoretical claims instead of incorporating them into coding rules.

Previous Work on (Enduring) Rivalries

In one sense, there has been an abundance of work on rivalries. Yet, in examining the scholarly literature, one does not see direct evidence of it. This is because work on rivalries has not carried the rivalry moniker and has primarily been confined to the analysis of a single prolonged competition between two or more states. Most prominent have been those concerned with the United States–Soviet Union rivalry (Bialer 1988; Nincic 1989) and the Arab–Israeli conflict (Herzog 1982). These are primarily descriptive studies that, although insightful on individual events, do not offer much in the way of a theoretical understanding of how rivalries evolve. Furthermore, they offer little in the way of generalizations that extend beyond the single case at hand. Except as excellent sources on the history of individual rivalries, we largely ignore this segment of the literature.

With the rivalry approach in mind, we can now survey the literature on enduring and other rivalries. Crucial to understanding our project and its relationship to this growing literature is the distinction between the rivalry approach and rivalries (particularly enduring ones) as an object of study. Great effort (e.g., Goertz and Diehl 1993; Thompson 1995) has gone into definitional issues (see chapter 2 for a discussion of these efforts), which is the first step in studying a phenomenon in its own right. Yet, with rare exceptions, there has been little work on explaining various aspects of the (enduring) rivalry phenomenon. Nevertheless, beyond historical works, there has been a range of research on enduring rivalries and their processes.

As it stands, the field has no general theory of enduring rivalry. Various studies address particular aspects of enduring rivalries, but none pretends to provide a global view. Above, we outlined the punctuated equilibrium model of enduring rivalries, which has implications for all stages of the rivalry life cycle. In our survey of the existing work on enduring rivalries we pay special attention to the relevance of such work for the punctuated equilibrium model.

Rivalries as a Primary Focus

More recently, the intrinsic importance of rivalries as a focus of study in their own right has been recognized. Several works address issues similar to those in this book. These include the origins, dynamics, conditions for war, and termination of rivalries. Generally, these studies have focused exclusively on enduring rivalries.

The Origins of Rivalries

Few studies deal with understanding the beginning of rivalries, exclusive of interstate conflict in general (e.g., Maoz 1982). Yet, as implied in Hensel (1996), it may not be necessary to consider the origins of rivalries (even enduring ones) as any different from the initiation of international conflict in general. Hensel argues that the behavior of the disputants in their first few militarized interactions determines whether an enduring rivalry will form or whether the competition will die out. In this way, his explanation for the origins of enduring rivalries is based on the dynamics of the rivalry process, and not on the initial conditions surrounding the first militarized confrontation between the rivals. This is largely contrary to the specifications of the punctuated equilibrium model in which rivalries lock-in early to patterns of conflict and are not much affected by factors peculiar to the first conflict interactions. In their game-theoretic analysis of four Middle East rivalries, Maoz and Mor (1996) find that the enduring rivalries exhibit acute conflict at the outset with a constant motivation to extend the conflict from the beginning. This suggests that conflicts do not “evolve” into enduring rivalries, but supports the punctuated equilibrium expectation that they exhibit severe rivalry characteristics from their origin.

Various other studies look to initial and other conditions to understand how rivalries, especially enduring ones, develop. This provides us some clues to the initial conditions that are unspecified in the punctuated equilibrium model. Levy and Ali (1998) conducted a case study of the Anglo-Dutch rivalry over the period 1609–52. They explored why a purely commercial rivalry remained peaceful for almost a half-century, but then turned into a militarized rivalry that was soon to experience three wars in relatively short succession. Initially, they point out that the Dutch and the English had diametrically opposed economic interests, which made them logical candidates to clash with one another. Reinforcing this conflict, economic liberalism determined Dutch strategies, while the British pursued a mercantilist strategy. This distinction and the structure of international trade may help explain why these two states were in dispute, but it does not necessarily account for the militarized aspects of the competition, and the authors are quick to avoid attributing too much to these factors. Brummett (1999) also cites commercial interests as the basis for the rivalry between the Ottoman Empire and Venice. We should note that a related argument has been put forward by Friedman and Lebard (1991) with respect to future relations between the United States and Japan. They contend that the Cold War held the two states together against a common external enemy (the Soviet Union) and that the absence of that threat now will lead to the two states to become serious rivals; they also argue that competition over resources will become stiff and almost inevitably involve military confrontation. Based on Levy and Ali’s analysis, however, differing economic strategies or market competitions are not enough to turn a trade rivalry violent—several other factors must be at work.

One key factor is the relative power distribution between the two sides. Levy and Ali argue that British naval inferiority until the 1640s prevented them from seriously challenging the Dutch. This suggestion that power imbalance inhibits rivalry conflict is related to the contention of Vasquez (1993) and others that interactions between states of approximately equal capability will be different from other interactions and perhaps more severe. The presence of bipolarity might also make the two leading states more likely to be rivals, as might be argued in the case of the United States and the Soviet Union following World War II (Larson 1999). The logic is similar to the one here—one state cannot plausibly challenge another unless it has sufficient capabilities to make threats credible. Although approximate parity seems to be a vital condition for a militarized rivalry, two caveats are in order: one theoretical and one empirical. Theoretically, parity may not be necessary if the potential rival disadvantaged by the status quo is superior in strength. In that circumstance, preponderance by the revisionist state may be enough to start a rivalry. Empirically, it is evident that not all enduring rivalries between states take place between approximate equals. Although lists of rivals vary across the studies, a significant minority of them involve states with widely disparate capabilities. Thus, approximate parity may be important in many cases, but it is not a necessary condition for militarized rivalry.

Another key factor, noted by Vasquez (1998) in a case study of the Pacific theater of World War II, is the importance of territorial issues as a basis for enduring rivalries. Rule (1999) also notes that the competition over territory (along with ideology) was an important element in the origins of the Franco-Spanish rivalry of the late fifteenth century. Although there has been a large number of ongoing claims over territory, not all have resulted in militarized disputes or the development of long-standing rivalries. Huth (1996a) looks at the role of territorial claims since 1950 in the origins of enduring rivalries. Huth uses a modified realist model, which includes both domestic and international political factors, to explain how states become involved in enduring rivalries over territory. Importantly, he notes that the relative strength of the challenger does not have much of an effect and that states also do not frequently challenge allies or extant treaty commitments by resort to militarized action. Rather, domestic concerns, especially ethnic and linguistic ties between one's own population and those living in the disputed territory, are significantly associated with the recurrence of militarized conflict. Such findings are of special policy concern given the renewal of nationalism and ethnic conflict in the post-Cold War era.

Domestic political pressures are also important factors in other analyses of rivalry origins. Levy and Ali (1998) note that early domestic instability in England inhibited its ability to challenge the Dutch. Later domestic political pressures led that rivalry to heat up, become militarized, and go to war several times early in the militarized phase of the rivalry. Vasquez (1998) also

cites domestic political pressures on Japan, which led to that state's expansionist drive in Asia and ultimately its attack on the United States. These critical findings are another nail in the realist coffin, especially the proposition that international and domestic political processes are separate (see also Wayman and Diehl 1994). Maoz and Mor (1998) importantly affirm that cooperation among rivals is quite possible, but that this does not preclude the beginning or continuation of a rivalry. Rather, the key aspect is that both sides are dissatisfied with some situation leading to the onset and expansion of the rivalry. Yet it may also be that the absence of the ability or incentive for two states to cooperate (to mutually benefit each other in any meaningful way) may be a force in promoting rivalry (see Schroeder's 1999 argument vis-à-vis the Franco-Austrian rivalry), although this alone would seem to be insufficient.

Two conference papers (Hensel and Sowers 1998; Stinnett and Diehl 1998) attempt to model the development of enduring rivalries. Each looks at the impact of structural and behavioral factors, roughly corresponding to the punctuated equilibrium and evolutionary models (Hensel 1996), respectively, on the onset of rivalry. The findings of each study reveal that both structural (e.g., power distribution) and behavioral (e.g., dispute outcomes) factors influence the development of enduring rivalries. Nevertheless, such studies do not provide tests of the two models against one another. This is similar to many studies of the democratic peace in which normative and institutional explanations are each found to have some utility in accounting for the lack of war between democratic states.

Thus, scant findings indicate that parity, territorial issues, and domestic political pressures were associated with the beginning of rivalries, with no strong mitigating effects from some early cooperation between rivals. Some questions remain about whether the origins of rivalries, even enduring ones, are any different from international conflict in general.

Our empirical analyses are not centrally concerned with the origins of rivalries in that we do not present a comprehensive model of how they come into being. Rather we limit ourselves to demonstrating (in chapter 11) that political shocks of a large magnitude are associated with the beginnings of rivalries, functioning as virtual necessary conditions. What other conditions might be necessary is left for future research, one of the many items appropriate for the concluding chapter to this book (chapter 13).

The Dynamics of Rivalries

A second set of concerns centers on rivalry dynamics, that is, the interactions between rivals following the onset of the rivalry, but prior to the termination point. As with most studies of rivalries, the dominant feature is that conflict events are not independent of each or other exogenous conflict events (this contrasts with traditional conflict analyses). Accordingly, much of the attention is focused on identifying the interconnections of conflict events. McGinnis and

Williams (1989) modeled the U.S.-Soviet rivalry over time with appropriate consideration for how past actions affected contemporary and future decisions. Even though the model was only for the superpower dyad, it appears applicable to other rivalries. More precisely, some scholars have looked at how previous interactions in the rivalry affect future behavior. Wayman and Jones (1991) consider the impact of previous disputes on subsequent disputes in a rivalry; they find that certain outcomes (e.g., capitulation) of those disputes are more likely to produce frequent future disputes or disputes that are more violent (after stalemates). Similarly, Hensel (1996) reports that decisive or compromise outcomes to disputes lessen the likelihood of future confrontations within the rivalry. There may also be some evidence of learning over the course of a rivalry. Larson (1999) argues that the United States and the Soviet Union learned conflict management and how to avoid war based on their behaviors during successive crises.

The dynamics of rivalries may not be influenced only by their own pasts, but also by their interconnections with other conflicts and rivalries. We make this point above and explicitly test for it in chapter 12. Muncaster and Zinnes (1993) create a model of an international system that is capable of tracking the evolution of rivalries, including how those rivalries influence the relations (and potential rivalries) of other states in the system. A dispute involving two states not only influences their future relations, but also impacts all other dyadic relations in the system. Also in the formal modeling tradition, McGinnis (1990) offers a model of regional rivalries that identifies optimum points for aid, arms, and alignments in those rivalries; this again provides for exogenous conflicts to influence the dynamics of rivalries.

A number of empirical studies confirm the significance of third-party conflict to the dynamics of rivalries. Ingram (1999) notes that the British-Russian rivalry was influenced by these states' relations with Asian client states. Schroeder (1999) boldly states that the Franco-Austrian rivalry was kept from being resolved by its interconnection with other ongoing European rivalries. According to Levy and Ali (1998), the end of the Dutch revolt against Spain led to the conditions that permitted Dutch economic expansion and the initiation of the rivalry with England. States sometimes have limited carrying capacities in the number of rivalries to which they can devote attention and resources. The Anglo-Dutch rivalry was also linked with the Anglo-French rivalry. England's undeclared war against France resulted in the seizure of Dutch ships that were trading with France, analogous to the contagion model noted by Siverson and Starr (1991), in which a given conflict spills over to encompass neighboring countries. The intersection of these two rivalries had the effect of escalating the competition between the Dutch and the British, who had previously managed their disputes without resort to war. Kinsella (1994a, 1994b, 1995) studied the dynamics of some rivalries in the Middle East with special attention to how the superpower rivalry influenced these minor-power rivalries.

There is a pattern of action-reaction to superpower arms transfers to that region. He finds that Soviet arms transfers exacerbated rivalry conflicts in several cases, whereas U.S. arms supplies to Israel had no strong positive or negative effects. He also notes that U.S. arms transfer policy may have actually dampened conflict in the Iran–Iraq rivalry. It is clear from Kinsella’s studies that the superpower rivalry affected the dynamics of the minor power rivalries in the Middle East, although the reverse was not generally true.

Beyond the interconnection of conflicts over space and time, there is some scant evidence that certain conditions affect rivalry behavior. Hensel (1996) finds that rivalries with prominent territorial components and those that experience capability shifts among the rivals are more likely to have recurring conflict and have that conflict recur sooner. The presence of a democratic dyad also apparently has a dampening effect on conflict recurrence in the rivalry. Yet he acknowledges that the strength of these general findings varies across different phases of rivalries, citing different patterns in the early parts of rivalries versus the middle or latter phases, a contention at odds with the punctuated equilibrium model. Ingram (1999) notes a host of factors—technological, ideological, and geographical—as influences on the dynamics of the British-Russian rivalry.

In addition to the concern with the factors that affect the dynamics of rivalries, there has been some attention to the “stability” of rivalries as well as the patterns in the dynamics of rivalries. In our punctuated equilibrium conception, enduring rivalries exhibit great stability over time and their patterns are not easily disrupted. For Cioffi-Revilla (1998), stability was defined as the probability of rivalry continuation into the future. In his analysis, a hazard rate for termination was used to indicate whether rivalries had an increasing or decreasing tendency to end, with the latter signifying a stable relationship. His results indicated three phases of rivalry stability: initial stability, maturation, and termination. In the initial phase, he discovered that rivalries were very stable and therefore not prone to end in their early phases. Maoz and Mor (1998) found that the games of Deadlock and Bully were the most common in young rivalries, suggesting that the early stages of enduring rivalries are marked by hostility on both sides with few attempts (at least successful ones) at conciliation, cooperation, and conflict resolution.

The maturation or midlife period shows that rivalries become mildly unstable, with an increasing hazard rate for termination. Perhaps this indicates that many rivalries never go beyond the proto-rivalry stage and enduring rivalries are special cases that seem to run against the tide. In the termination phase, within the latter stage of rivalries, they have a strong propensity to end. There was not a great deal of variation in the stability of rivalries across various conditions, although “unbalanced” (those with capability disparities) were more unstable.

Levy and Ali (1998) point out the importance of political shocks for the stability of rivalry relationships. The Thirty Years War in Germany is cited as a

shock that profoundly altered Dutch relationships with its current and potential rivals. The death of Frederick Henry also brought a lull to the Dutch-Spanish competition and set in motion events that led to increased competition with the British. In effect, an exogenous and an endogenous shock had the effect (along with some other factors) of ending one militarized rivalry and beginning another. This is consistent with our expectation that political shocks will be necessary to break established rivalry patterns.

Another focus is the patterns over time in the dynamics of enduring rivalries and the role of learning in rival behavior. We noted above our expectations about the apparent relative stability of enduring rivalries and some empirical evidence to support that notion. There are some notable patterns over time in that stability. Cioffi-Revilla (1998) reports that rivalries are less stable over time; yet some enduring rivalries buck this trend and continue for more than one generation. Some of this might be attributed to outcomes of previous disputes. To the extent that conflict produces stalemates and not conciliatory or compromise outcomes, the basis for additional and more rapidly recurring conflict is there (Hensel 1996). Another temporal pattern is the tendency for twentieth-century rivalries to be more unstable. The twentieth century has significantly more rivalries than its predecessor, owing largely to the relative ease with which states can interact with one another and the larger number of states in the international system; in effect, the “opportunity” (Most and Starr 1989) for rivalries is greater. The greater number of rivalries (of all varieties including enduring ones) may mean that states must divide their attention and resources more broadly than in the past, and it may not be surprising that some rivalries end quickly as states move on to meet other, more pressing challenges.

Of course, the declining stability of rivalries in this century might also be related, in part, to another trend uncovered by Cioffi-Revilla: bipolar systems produce more unstable rivalries than multipolar ones. The Cold War bipolar system, then, may account for the relatively greater instability than the nineteenth century, which was multipolar throughout.

Beyond trends in stability, Maoz and Mor (1998) highlight a number of patterns in the evolution of individual rivalries. A key finding is that there cannot be a fixed game assumption in trying to model the processes of enduring rivalries. The preferences and perceptions of the players shift over the course of the rivalry. Thus, iterative game analyses that use Prisoners’ Dilemma or Chicken (common in deterrence analyses) to try to understand state bargaining behavior are unlikely to produce coherent results. Different game structures and preferences occur throughout the rivalry, and one must be able to understand the process of preference and structural change in order to model the interactions accurately. Nevertheless, Maoz and Mor indicate that learning (defined as a reevaluation of prior beliefs that is triggered by a discrepancy between expectations and experience) cannot really account for the game transformations that occur over the course of a rivalry. The appearance of exogenous and

endogenous shocks is again associated with this transformation. Here the authors point to significant shifts in capability (consistent with Hensel 1996 noted above) and leadership change in the rival states as important factors conditioning game transformations.

Maoz and Mor do find that some adaptive learning does occur within rivalries, but their model is often incorrect in predicting the behavior of the rivals. They cite perceptual shifts about what game is thought to be in play and incomplete information about the process by scholars as possibly responsible for this discrepancy. In any case, there appears to be less learning and its subsequent impact than one might expect, although such processes are often hard to identify and assess (see Levy 1994).

Hensel (1996) has an evolutionary model of rivalries in which different kinds of rivalries—minor, proto, and enduring—are not distinct from one another at the outset. Rather, rivalries gradually evolve into more frequent and serious confrontations. Thus, Hensel reports that rivalries become more severe over time and that future conflict becomes more likely and in more rapid succession. His evolutionary model posits a rivalry process that is quite different than that of the punctuated equilibrium model; the former places more emphasis on gradual change and many shifts in rivalry patterns over time. This conforms to the notion that enduring rivalries are most dangerous in their latter phases. Vasquez (1998) also reports a pattern of rising conflict in recurrent disputes during the United States–Japan rivalry that led to World War II, although this is only a single-rivalry analysis.

Within the context of rivalries, it is not surprising that states with serious and ongoing security threats would consider augmenting their capabilities by one of the most expeditious means: military buildups. With respect to military buildups, Vasquez (1998) notes that arms races intensified the rivalries in the Pacific. Importantly, he does not indicate any deterrent effects on conflict in the rivalry stemming from those enhanced capabilities (Huth and Russett 1993).

We devote a good portion of the second half of this book to the dynamics of rivalries. Most obviously, we establish the stability of rivalries over time in the next chapter by reference to the *basic rivalry level* (BRL). We also look at exogenous influences on conflict patterns in rivalries in chapters 10, 11, and 12, considering how international mediation attempts, political shocks, and linkages to other rivalries respectively influence conflict levels in rivalries. Of course, our analysis of the democratic peace according to the rivalry approach in chapter 6 included a discussion of how regime change affected conflict patterns in extant rivalries.

War in Rivalries

Of course, most international conflict research in general has been concerned with the conditions associated with the outbreak of war. Little of the research

directly on rivalries, however, has dealt with war. Those studies that use rivalries as a background condition focus on war, but they answer questions about deterrence, power transitions, and the like and their relationship to war rather than making direct theoretical or empirical contributions about rivalries and war. There are, nevertheless, a few exceptions to this pattern. Vasquez (1993, 1996) argued that geographic contiguity between rivals was the critical factor in whether a rivalry went to war or not. Geographic contiguity between rivals signifies that the conflict between them was a territorial one, and in the view of Vasquez, conflict without this strong territorial dimension will not end in war. Thompson (1999) makes a similar argument in noting that the Anglo-American rivalry did not experience war after 1812, in part, because any territory in dispute between the British and the Americans was judged not to be worth fighting over. Yet in a reexamination of the effect of territorial disputes on escalation in rivalries, Rasler and Thompson (1998a) indicate that major powers are less driven by territorial disputes. Furthermore, they find “positional disputes” must be added to the equation along with contiguity to help explain when rivalries will go to war—territorial concerns alone are not sufficient.

Systemic conditions are often cited by neorealists and idealists as constraining or enhancing choices for war. Yet there are also powerful critics (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1988) of the importance of systemic (as opposed to dyadic or other) factors. According to limited current research, some aspects of the international system were important for the onset of war in rivalries, but generally they were not central. The balance of power at the system level is a classic neorealist factor, but Levy and Ali (1998) note that this made little difference in the rivalry development or war between the British and the Dutch. Nevertheless, Vasquez (1998) cites another systemic variable largely ignored by realism and its variants: international rules and norms. He notes that the breakdown of the Washington Conference structure, which sought to control military competition (especially in weaponry) between the major powers after World War I, removed the rules and norms necessary to “manage” the competition between the leading Pacific states. In this way, limiting the anarchy of the international system can have a mitigating effect on rivalry competition and while perhaps international norms and rules may not be enough to prevent or end rivalries, they might assist in restraining the most severe manifestations of rivalries. A similar argument is made by Larson (1999) in her assessment of why the superpower rivalry managed to avoid war.

Other conventional factors thought to be associated with war also receive a mixed assessment from current studies. The power distribution is often a centerpiece of models of international conflict, although there is considerable disagreement among scholars whether parity or preponderance is the most dangerous condition. Geller (1998) finds no general relationship between the capability distribution and the identity of the initiator of wars in major power rivalries. Nevertheless, he points out that *unstable* capability distributions are

substantively associated with the occurrence of war, although he is quick to acknowledge that they approach a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for conflict escalation in the rivalry. Changing capability balances in major power dyads have recently been found to be significant in a number of studies (e.g., Houweling and Siccama 1991; Geller 1992; Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi 1992). Geller's findings are also consistent with dynamic models of capability change including the power transition (Kugler and Organski 1989) and hegemonic decline (Gilpin 1981) models.

Another conventional factor thought to be associated with war is alliances. Vasquez (1998) argues that the alliance structure in the Pacific did not prevent war, suggesting there was little deterrent effect. These results are largely consistent with the prevailing findings in the scholarly literature (e.g., Siverson and Sullivan 1984) that alliances have little role in the initiation of war (there has been some reevaluation of that view, see Smith 1996; Gartner and Siverson 1996). Despite this general pattern, Vasquez (1998, 217) does link alliances with the march toward war in the Pacific. He argues: "A major state's alignment with a weak state can increase the probability of war . . . because weak allies led by hard-liners will not support compromises that avoid war. Therefore . . . [alliances] constrain conciliatory acts." This conception of alliances and war is quite different from the traditional capability aggregation view of alliances and conflict. Instead, it suggests that we consider how alliances affect bargaining and how the alliance variable interacts with other concerns, here domestic political processes.

Domestic political processes again were found to be critical in the dynamics of enduring rivalries. Vasquez (1998) notes that domestic hard-liners pushed for war in Japan, preventing that country from making more conciliatory gestures and accepting some peace offers short of war. Levy and Ali (1998) also note strong domestic pressures in England for hard-line policies and external actions. Perhaps this is why the English adopted a hard-line bargaining strategy that prevented effective conflict management. In contrast, Thompson (1999) argues that domestic political pressures in Britain actually encouraged de-escalation and lessened the chances for war in its relations with the United States.

Another conventional factor, democratic regime type, has also been the subject of analysis vis-à-vis war in rivalries. Although subject to some controversy, international conflict research (e.g., Russett 1993) has established that stable democratic states rarely or never fight against each other in a war. Not surprisingly then, some scholars have also found some pacifying effects from democracy in rivalries. Modelski (1999) claims that the rivalry between Portugal and Venice several hundred years ago was more benign than other rivalries because of its "democratic lineage" and that democratic rivalries are more peaceful and more likely to be resolved "on their merits" rather than by military force. Thompson (1999) also cites mutual democracy as a pacifying

condition in the Anglo-American rivalry. Nevertheless, Thompson and Tucker (1997) note that intense rivalries, what they refer to as principal rivalries, can occur between democratic states and indeed argue that a significant portion of pre-World War II conflict revolved around United States–United Kingdom and United Kingdom–France rivalries (although they note that direct war was avoided in each case). Furthermore, the effects of being in a rivalry were found to be more important than the effects of democracy. Monadically, democratic and other states were found to have behaved similarly within rivalries; only outside of the rivalry context were democratic states more peaceful (Rasler and Thompson 1998b).

The conditions for war in rivalries were generally not those at the systemic level according to previous research, although there was a suggestion in one case that international norms and rules might have mitigated the war in the Pacific. Unstable military balances, rather than a particular capability distribution, tended to reinforce or exacerbate the processes leading to war in rivalries. Alliances generally did not directly influence the onset of war. Nevertheless, alliances might have influenced some domestic political processes, which were found to be critical in promoting hard-line bargaining and other aggressive foreign policy actions. Territorial issues were again most often associated with conflict escalation in enduring rivalries, and joint democracy is thought to help rivals avoid war.

Not surprisingly, because we reject the causes of war framework in favor of the rivalry approach, we are not centrally concerned with the occurrence of war in this book. Instead, we have a broader concern with the *severity* of conflict, which includes war but conflict short of war as well. Thus, some analysis of rivalry dynamics in subsequent chapters may have implication for understanding war in rivalries, but our approach provides only indirect evidence for the relevant conditions.

The Termination of Rivalries

There is an extensive literature about the termination of war (e.g., Wittman 1979). Yet, this is not synonymous with the end of rivalries. Wars take place at various junctures of rivalries, at the beginning, middle, and ending phases. Thus, understanding how a particular war ends may offer few or no clues to the end of a rivalry, which may persist for years after war termination. Cioffi-Revilla (1998) argues that rivalries are unstable (and therefore more likely to “die” or end at any given point in time) the longer they persist, but this occurs only they reach midlife. Although the hazard rate for enduring rivalries may be increasing toward the end of their lives, their conflict level shows little sign of abating, and the precise time point of rivalry termination cannot largely be predicted by the hazard rate.

There are several possible answers to the puzzle of how rivalries end, something that is not well understood given the sudden and largely unexpected end

to the Cold War. Our punctuated equilibrium model suggests that rivalries end suddenly, and in connection with dramatic environmental change and other, unspecified conditions. Thompson (1999) argues that rivalry termination is a “trial and error” process in which states learn more about their opponent’s preferences and positions and eventually devise a solution that reconciles competing positions and protects each sides interests.

Bennett (1993, 1996) also adopts a rational choice mode in attempting to explain rivalry termination. As we suggested above, his empirical analysis finds that the occurrence of war in a rivalry does not affect the duration of that rivalry. Neither does the existence of bipolarity or the balance of power between the rivals seem to enhance the prospects for ending rivalries. Rather relatively low issue salience at the center of the rivalry contributed to shorter rivalries. Again, territorial issues were thought to be a key example of high-salience issues. As we noted above, the absence of territorial issues made rivalries less likely to start and escalate to war if they did begin; now we also see that the lack of a territorial component to the rivalry may make it end more swiftly. Bennett also notes that common external threats makes rivals less likely to continue their competition. One might assume that common external enemies engender greater feelings of amity between the rivals (“the enemy of my enemy is my friend”). Yet other rivalries reduce the resources and attention that can be directed to extant rivalries; states must make choices on which enemies to focus on and this may mean ending one rivalry in order to pursue others.

Two other approaches explore the conditions under which rivalries are terminated. Gibler (1997) demonstrates that rivalries can end with the signing of an alliance that is in effect a territorial settlement treaty. This finding is largely consistent with research discussed above that suggested a strong territorial component to the origins of enduring rivalries. Although Gibler does not investigate whether territorial disputes were important in the origins of the rivalries he considers, he does find that the rivalry ends when the territorial dispute is removed from the relationship.

There is also a plethora of studies that seek to explain the end of the Cold War (e.g., Deudney and Ikenberry 1991–92). Unfortunately, there are several problems with this literature if we are interested in insights on rivalry termination. First, much of the literature is concerned with explaining the collapse of the Soviet Union. The end of the superpower rivalry is then treated as one of many consequences of that collapse. Yet theoretically it is not clear whether there is a point being made about domestic political changes and the end of rivalries or whether the end of rivalries is somehow slightly different than the implosion of one of the rivals. Second, it is not clear (whatever the focus) that such studies can or are designed to be generalizable to rivalries other than the U.S.-Soviet one.

Despite these limitations, Lebow (1995) has attempted to use the Cold War case to develop a set of conditions he believes accounts for the thawing of U.S.-Soviet relations under Gorbachev and the winding down of rivalries in general. For accommodation to occur, he argues that the presence of the following three conditions for one of the rivals is critical: (1) a leader committed to domestic reforms, where foreign cooperation is necessary for those reforms, (2) the failure of rivalry and confrontation in the past to achieve a rival's goals and their likely failure in the future, and (3) the belief that conciliatory gestures will be reciprocated. Thus, Lebow sees the end of rivalries beginning from domestic political considerations.

Bennett (1998) attempted to synthesize many of his and other findings on enduring rivalry termination. He confirms Cioffi-Revilla's (1998) finding that enduring rivalries have a positive hazard rate, that is, an increasing tendency toward termination over time. Bennett concludes that domestic political factors and issue salience seem to be most associated with rivalry termination. He gets distinctly mixed results regarding security concerns as a driving force behind the end of rivalries. Similarly, and most important for our concerns, he also gets mixed results on the impact of political shocks on rivalry termination, an argument that we make in chapter 11. Yet his analysis of political shocks does not properly test our contention that shocks operate only as a necessary condition for rivalry termination because his analysis treats them as sufficient. Furthermore, his analysis assumes that political shocks have an immediate and single-year effect on rivalry behavior, a conception at odds with our contention that major political changes are likely to reverberate through the system over the course of several years, rather than at a fixed point. In any case, Bennett does provide some clues about the conditions for rivalry termination beyond those that we specify in chapter 11 and helps fill in some gaps not generally specified by the punctuated equilibrium model.

Recurring Conflict

A number of studies have focused on how conflict reoccurs. This is related to rivalries in that they are a form of recurring conflict that may persist over a broad time period. The part of the work on recurring conflict that concerns us is at the dyadic level of analysis (i.e., repeated conflict between the same pairs of states) rather than repeated conflict involvement at the national level (i.e., a single state "addicted to conflict"—for example, Stoll 1984) or the system level (i.e., the tendency for conflicts to cluster in time within a system). Dyadic recurring conflict most closely parallels what we signify as rivalries between the same pair of states, although usually the concern with recurring conflict has been with one-time, short-term recurrence rather than with repeated conflict over a long time period, characteristic of enduring rivalries.

The phenomenon of dyadic recurring conflict is hardly rare. Maoz (1984) reports that 76 percent of disputes are followed by another dispute between the

same states. These findings are mirrored in several other studies that find a link between previous conflict and the likelihood of future conflict between the same states (Richardson 1960; Anderson and McKeown 1987). That conflicts reoccur is strongly supported empirically, but there is little understanding about why they reoccur.

A history of previous disputes between the same states is a good predictor of future conflict (Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel 1996), but begs the question of why that conflict is likely. The answer requires greater attention to conditions surrounding the conflict or the interactions themselves. It may be that decisive outcomes or imposed settlements in previous disputes may dampen the tendency for conflicts to reoccur, suggesting that stalemated outcomes may have the opposite effect (Maoz 1984). Hensel (1994) had similar findings, but further added that the prospects for future disputes were also influenced by shifts in military capability between the states. For example, he reports that stalemates and compromises were often followed quickly by new disputes initiated by the stronger state, which was declining in relative capabilities. Anderson and McKeown (1987) also speak of the victor in a previous dispute initiating another conflict in order to reestablish victory. Goertz and Diehl (1992b) found that recurring conflict after a territorial change was most likely when that change was formalized by a treaty and was considered very important to the losing side. Territorial changes were more stable when the losing side was relatively weak and the gaining side regarded the territory as important. Generally, United Nations intervention in a crisis has not been found to have a significant impact on whether two disputants will clash again in the near future (Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel 1996).

The consequences of recurring conflict appear fairly clear (and this is confirmed with respect to enduring rivalries in chapter 3). Recurring conflict between the same set of states appears to increase the chance of conflict escalation and war. Leng (1983) found that states adopted more coercive bargaining strategies in successive confrontations with same opponent, with war almost always the result after three disputes. Brecher (1984) notes similarly that protracted conflicts are more violent with a greater risk of war than nonrecurring conflict. Fearon's reanalysis (1994b) of Huth's (1988) data suggests that past confrontation lessens the probability that future deterrence attempts will be successful.

The literature on recurring conflict indicates that repeated violence between the same pairs of states is more common than might be expected and with dangerous consequences. There are some clues about what conditions recurring conflict, specifically the outcomes of previous confrontations, but the evidence is far from complete. In this study we hope to fill some of these gaps and give insights to both rivalries and, by implication, all forms of recurring conflict.

In this chapter, we have reintroduced our list of enduring rivalries, which will be the objects of study for the rest of this volume. Much of the previous

work on different aspects of enduring rivalry supports the punctuated equilibrium model, but many of its expectations have not been tested directly. In the next chapter, we sketch out in more detail some of the central characteristics of the punctuated equilibrium model and begin to empirically address some of its claims.